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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, social networks of ever increasing size are studied
by researchers from a range of disciplines. The data under-
lying these networks is often automatically gathered from
API’s, websites or existing databases. As a result, the qual-
ity of this data is typically not manually validated, and the
resulting networks may be based on false, biased or incom-
plete data. In this paper, we investigate the effect of data
quality issues on the analysis of large networks. We focus on
the global board interlock network, in which nodes represent
firms across the globe, and edges model social ties between
firms – shared board members holding a position at both
firms. First, we demonstrate how we can automatically as-
sess the completeness of a large dataset of 160 million firms,
in which data is missing not at random. Second, we present
a novel method to increase the accuracy of the entries in
our data. By comparing the expected and empirical char-
acteristics of the resulting network topology, we develop a
technique that automatically prunes and merges duplicate
nodes and edges. Third, we use a case study of the board
interlock network of Sweden to show how poor quality data
results in incorrect network topologies, biased centrality val-
ues and abnormal influence spread under a well-known dif-
fusion model. Finally, we demonstrate how our data quality
assessment methods help restore the correct network struc-
ture, ultimately allowing us to derive meaningful and correct
results from analyzing the network.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, the amount of digital informa-
tion has been doubling roughly every two years. At the
same time, there is an ongoing and prevailing desire to ex-
tract meaningful knowledge from this data. Although many
knowledge discovery methods and techniques are scalable to
larger volumes of data, “big data” [1] has the significant and
largely unaddressed problem of “veracity”. This refers to the
fact that the explosion in the amount of available data has
resulted in a situation in which researchers can no longer
manually validate the quality of their data [2]. Data quality
most dominantly relates to questions of completeness (what
part of the data do we have, and what part do we miss?)
and accuracy (is the data that we have correct and suitable
for answering our particular domain questions?). Here we
set out to assess how these issues can be addressed in the
context of (social) network analysis.
In this paper we focus on so-called corporate networks, in
which ties represent particular relationships between corpo-
rations. Ties in corporate networks can be based on a variety
of relationships between firms, including trade [3], borrowing
and lending of money [4], ownership [5], or as we will analyze
in this paper: shared board members. In these networks of
interlocking directorates, also referred to as board interlock
networks, a node represents a firm and an edge between two
firms denotes that these firms share at least one board mem-
ber or director. An example of a board interlock network
is given in Figure 1. Board interlocks are common prac-
tice in today’s corporate world, and over the past century,
social scientists have extensively studied the causes and con-
sequences of board interlocks. See for example the excellent
overview given in [6], where Mizruchi discusses how inter-
locks relate to collusion, monitoring (e.g., banks keeping an
eye on firms they invested in), legitimacy (attracting board
members with a particular reputation in a certain area that
is of importance to the firm), individual career advancement
and social cohesion (social ties among the upper class). Pre-
vious research has established that networks of interlocking
directorates facilitate the spread of governance routines and
practices, the exchange of resources, communication and the
dissemination of new ideas [7, 8]. Since a significant number
of directors has positions at two or more firms, the board
meetings of these firms connect the majority of big busi-
nesses in the world. For instance, Davis [8] discusses how
the majority of the corporate elite would rapidly be infected
by a contagious disease as a result of the small world prop-
erty of the network of interlocking directorates.
Corporate networks have interesting topological character-
istics common to real-world networks, including a fat tailed
degree distribution, the emergence of a giant component and
very low pairwise distances between nodes [9]. Researchers
have thus applied established social network analysis meth-
ods and techniques [10] to corporate networks. Commu-
nity detection has been used to understand the geographi-
cal dimension of the structure of these networks [11, 12] and
centrality measures provide insight into powerful firms and
countries in the network [13].
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Initially, social scientists studied only small networks of in-
terlocking directorates, typically based on a few hundred
firms and their relationships. Researchers carefully double-
checked the data they manually gathered from annual re-
ports of the companies involved. Nowadays, large databases
on corporations are provided by commercial corporate in-
formation providers such as Orbis, BoardEx, ThomsonOne
and Bloomberg, including information on their financial per-
formance and board composition. The availability of these
databases with millions of firms allows our board interlock
networks to be automatically constructed from the avail-
able firm and board member data. Here, we focus on a
dataset extracted from Orbis, a large information provider
that gathers data from country registers across the world,
and then makes this data available through one database (for
details, see Section 2). The sheer volume of this contempo-
rary big corporate network data (BCND, see [14]) means
that it is no longer possible to manually check each firm, let
alone their board composition, for correctness. However, the
quality of our data is diverse across countries and country
registers. Indeed, the problem of data quality (completeness
and accuracy) comes into play here.
The first data quality issue, completeness, is not necessarily
problematic, for example when we have a dataset in which
data is missing completely at random (MCAR), or when
missing values are directly correlated with a known vari-
able (MAR). We find that in our dataset information about
some attributes (e.g., number of employees) is correlated
with other attributes with better availability – it is MAR.
However, often it is not the attributes but the companies
themselves that are not present in the data, meaning data is
missing not at random (MNAR). This may result in severe
problems, because if non-random parts of the data are miss-
ing, we can no longer consider it a reliable sample and derive
meaningful results for the system represented by the dataset
as a whole. For example, if we blindly use the data provided
by Orbis to compare countries, we observe that the average
Mexican firm is larger than the average firm in the United
States. In turns out that this is due to lower data quality
in Mexico, where many small companies are not included in
the data, thus increasing the average size of a company. If
we want to derive meaningful and actionable insights from
the board interlock network of these corporations, we need
to know exactly which firms we are missing.
A second problem, accuracy, is that we have no prior indi-
cation of whether there are duplicates in our data. These
duplicates can be accidental, for example as a result of entity
resolution errors introduced when the data was gathered by
the information providers, but they can also be the result
of administrative reasons. Firms often organize themselves
in multiple legal entities and parent-subsidiary constructions
to facilitate the autonomy of local branches, departments or,
most often, for certain legal or financial benefits. We want
to disregard these types of administrative firms and their
relationships from the network, such that we are able to de-
rive meaningful and representative results from a network in
which a node represents one distinct and autonomous firm,
and an edge represents a true board interlock between these
firms, facilitating the type of social relation between firms
discussed in our short survey of board interlock research pro-
vided above.
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Figure 1: Sample of the Swedish network of inter-
locking directorates. Based on largest 120 firms in
terms of revenue, connected through 422 interlocks.
Color and size are proportional to node degree.
The two data quality issues of completeness and accuracy
of corporate datasets obviously affect the topology of board
interlock networks. Missing, spurious or duplicate nodes or
edges affect the analysis of the network as well, for example
in terms of topological properties, centrality and the diffu-
sion of information [15]. In this paper, we address these data
quality problems in corporate network data. For the issue of
completeness we present in Section 3.1 a new quality assess-
ment method to analyze which part of the global firm data
can be used to ensure meaningful results. For the aspect of
accuracy, Section 3.2 proposes a data correction technique
that uses network characteristics to filter spurious firms and
connections in the corporate network. To demonstrate how
results change from fuzzy to more meaningful as data qual-
ity issues are addressed, we analyze in Section 4 their effect
on the network topology, centrality and influence spread in
the network of interlocking directorates of Sweden. Finally,
we show in Section 5 that the proposed method of assess-
ing and correcting the quality of corporate network data is
essential to ensure that results from analyzing the network
are not a mere product of systematic biases in the data,
but instead provide actually meaningful insights. Finally in
Section 6 we discuss extensions of the proposed methods to
other commonly studied (social) networks.
2. DATA
This section outlines how we collected our dataset, followed
by a description of how we constructed the board interlock
network that is analyzed in the experimental sections.
We started by creating a snapshot of the Orbis database1 in
November 2015, including all 160 million active companies
(no branches, foreign entities or business marked as ‘single
location’) and all 90 million directors holding a position at
1Orbis, Bureau van Dijk, http://orbis.bvdinfo.com
these companies. For each company we extracted its coun-
try, operating revenue, number of employees and global ulti-
mate owner (GUO). The GUO of a company is a controlling
shareholder (directly or indirectly owning at least 50% in
shares) that is not owned by any other company. For each
director we extracted all top executive (chief and director)
affiliations in the set of firms, obtaining 65 million current
positions. This dataset is the object of study in our analysis
of completeness in Section 3.1.
Next, we constructed the Swedish firm-to-firm board inter-
lock network, where only Swedish firms are considered, and
companies are connected if they share one or more direc-
tors. The resulting Swedish network is composed of 260,611
companies and 1,269,560 edges. Although the network also
contains many uninteresting small components of at most a
handful of nodes, we focus on its giant component in which
the lion share of economic activity in Sweden takes place.
This connected undirected graph contains a total of 94,496
nodes and 1,050,907 edges. In Section 3.2 and Section 4
we assess the quality in terms of accuracy of this network
dataset, investigating its topology and the results of apply-
ing methods such as centrality and influence spread models.
3. METHODOLOGY
The two major components of data quality, namely data
completeness and accuracy, are discussed and addressed in
the two subsections below, specifically in the context of cor-
porate data and the corporate board interlock network.
3.1 Completeness
Ensuring proper data analysis results requires unbiased rep-
resentative samples of a population. Unbiased representa-
tive samples are obtained when the distributions of each
variable in the sample match the distributions in the real
population. However, the distributions in the population
are generally unknown, i.e., our dataset has data missing
not at random (MNAR). In the case of our corporate data,
we usually either lack information about the distribution of
company sizes in a given country, or have only aggregated
data – e.g., the number of small, medium and large compa-
nies available.
Here, we propose to use aggregated data on segments of
the data to test the completeness of the full dataset. For
instance, Figure 2 shows the coverage of our dataset by cat-
egory (in terms of number of employees) as reported by the
European statistics bureau2. Some countries (e.g., Norway
(NO), Sweden (SE), Finland (FI) and Estonia (EE)) have
very complete information (all bars are close to the horizon-
tal line). However, some countries have relatively bad data
quality (e.g., Poland (PL), the Netherlands (NL) and Ger-
many (DE)). Moreover, we see that countries with bad data
quality usually have good information for large companies
and bad information for small companies. In order to un-
derstand the magnitude of the bias we first find the precise
relationship between quality and macroeconomic measures,
using countries with available aggregated data. We then
use this relation to extrapolate to countries without infor-
mation. In this section, we apply our method to a dataset
on corporations, where aggregated information at country
2EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
level is available. However, our method can be applied for
all datasets where aggregated information on one or more of
the individual’ attributes is available, given that we can es-
timate the underlying distribution. In Section 6 we discuss
in detail the generalizability of our approach.
We start by modeling the company size (in terms of its oper-
ating revenue) as a lognormal distribution. Lognormal dis-
tributions arise naturally in multiplicative processes, where
the (in this case revenue) growth between time t− 1 and t,
denoted Rt − Rt−1, depends on the combinations of a se-
ries of factors Fk (for example, random fluctuations, type
of business, population density, income of customers, etc.):
Rt−Rt−1 = Fk ·Rt−1. This model is known as the Gibrat’s
law [16]. The idea here is that the size (represented by rev-
enue) of companies varies in size according to Fk. After a
certain total time t (corresponding to the present time) it
holds that
Rt = R0 ·
t∏
k=1
(1 + Fk), (1)
and
logRt = logR0 +
t∑
k=1
log (1 + Fk). (2)
When using short time scales the effect of the factors is
small, and log (1 + Fk) ≈ Fk:
logRt = logR0 +
t∑
k=1
Fk. (3)
Assuming that Fk are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) we obtain that Rt is lognormally distributed (central
limit theorem) [17]. Moreover, a small change in the model,
namely that the number of time iterations varies for differ-
ent companies, produces power-law tails [17, 18], which we
observe in our data, as we show at the end of this section. It
is worth noting that the combinations of the factors within
Fk are likely to follow lognormal distributions themselves.
For instance, personal income follows lognormal distribu-
tions with power-law tails [17, 18] and population densities
have long tails [17].
Either if Fk are i.i.d. or if they exhibit long tails, revenue
distributions can be well fitted by lognormal distributions.
Lognormal distributions are characterized by two parame-
ters: scale σ and location µ. Importantly, the standard
deviation s is proportional to the mean m:
log (s) = log (m) +
1
2
log
(
eσ
2 − 1
)
(4)
When the means and standard deviations of the revenue of
all companies in a country are plotted against each other, the
values for every country with enough data lie in a straight
line (see Figure 3A), indicating that all countries share the
same σ. Since σ clusters around 2.0 in countries with known
better quality (Figure 3B), we fixed σ = 2.0.
Although this approach allows us to fix the scale and find
the maximum likelihood µ parameter of the distributions,
µ would be biased by data quality. In particular, we know
that rich countries have better quality and a better reporting
of small companies, which lowers the µ parameters. How-
ever, rich countries have larger companies, with increases
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Figure 2: Percentage of companies present in our dataset as a function of the number of employees working
at these companies: <10, 10-19, 20-49, 50-249 and >250 employees.
Variable code Variable name Mean effect % Models
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD 2013 GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 0.263048 23.2
SH.XPD.PUBL.GX.ZS 2013 Health expenditure, public (% of government ex... 0.220553 25.7
logAG.YLD.CREL.KG 2013 Cereal yield (kg per hectare) 0.207313 24.8
logIC.TAX.DURS 2013 Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours) -0.200198 24.0
AG.YLD.CREL.KG 2013 Cereal yield (kg per hectare) 0.198041 22.4
logTX.VAL.MRCH.R5.ZS 2013 Merchandise exports to developing economies in... 0.191862 22.8
logIC.EXP.DURS 2013 Time to export (days) -0.184246 21.4
BM.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT 2013 Personal remittances, paid (current US$) 0.179447 27.5
SP.RUR.TOTL.ZG 2013 Rural population growth (annual %) 0.174098 27.8
IC.TAX.TOTL.CP.ZS 2013 Total tax rate (% of commercial profits) -0.169697 33.4
Table 1: Predictors for the mean company revenue in a country (Rˆ), and average coefficient of the support
vector (mean effect), obtained using the Python sklearn (http://scikit-learn.org) package with a linear kernel
and the default penalty parameter C = 1. The rightmost columns shows the percentage of simulations in
which the variable was among the top 10 predictors. Only the indicators present in more than 20% of the
repetitions were considered. If the variable code is preceded with ’log’, then this variable was log-transformed.
the µ parameter. This confounding effect can be disentan-
gled by using country-level aggregated data. In order to
find the real µ parameter we obtained the number of com-
panies and combined revenue for all OECD countries3. All
currencies were converted to USD using exchanges rates on
March 25th ’16, adding India and completing missing in-
formation in Canada, Australia and the United States from
their statistics bureaus4.
We then estimated the logarithm of the theoretical mean of
the revenue distribution log (Rˆ) by using world development
indicators (WDI)5. Since log (Rˆ) = µ + σ2/2 and σ = 2.0,
estimating log (Rˆ) is equivalent to estimating µ. In order to
prevent overfitting, we fitted 1000 linear models using sup-
port vector regression on random samples containing 75%
of the countries. We iteratively dropped the worst indicator
until we found a core of 10 indicators. As shown in Table 1,
the main indicator is GDP per capita. In fact, this indicator
3OECD SSIS BSC ISIC4, Cat. 05 82 LESS K
4The aggregated revenue of companies in India and Canada
was estimated from the GDP of the country using the linear
relationship between logGDP and log (total revenue) of the
other countries (R2 = 0.975)
5WorldBank WDI, http://wdi.worldbank.org
alone can explain 72% of the variability in OECD countries
(82% if Norway is excluded). In general, larger income taxes
and bureaucracy times are correlated with smaller compa-
nies, while larger productivity, GDP per capita and personal
remittances paid are correlated with larger companies.
After estimating the revenue average we confirmed that it
closely matches the average extracted from the OECD data
(R2 = 0.91). We then used this relationship between log (Rˆ)
and WDI indicators to estimate log (Rˆ) for all countries in
the world. Next, we hypothesized that companies are added
to the source database in decreasing order of revenue. If
this would be true, there would be a quasi-linear country-
level relationship between the estimated average using WDI
indicators (Rˆ), and the product of the percentage of compa-
nies present in the dataset (C) and the average revenue in
our dataset (RObs). We found that this was indeed the case
(R2 = 0.82), and the three variables are related as follows:
log C = −1.3855− 0.954 log (RObs) + 1.1120 log (Rˆ). (5)
Thus, for any given country we can now calculate the theo-
retical average (and µ) using WDI indicators, and the com-
pleteness using the theoretical average and our dataset av-
erage. Finally, we estimated µ and therewith the complete-
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Figure 3: (A) Standard deviation vs. mean company
revenue by country in high income OECD (OEC),
high income nonOECD (NOC) and upper middle
income (UMC) countries. (B) Maximum likelihood
estimator of σ vs. percentage of companies (with
respect to Eurostat) present in our dataset.
ness C for all countries. We compared the distribution of
revenues in our dataset with the expected distribution us-
ing µ and C (Figure 4A). As expected, countries with good
quality in Figure 2 also have good quality in Figure 4A.
Canada, Australia and the US have sharp peaks at specific
revenue bins, which are caused by lax reporting requirement
in those countries. Moreover, similarly to income distribu-
tions [17, 18], we observe that revenue distributions are well-
described by lognormal distributions with power-law tails
for the ∼ 1% larger companies (Figure 4B–D). We conclude
from Figure 4A that data quality in terms of completeness
for large firms is generally good, while data quality for small
firms depends on the considered country.
3.2 Accuracy
In addition to the problem of missing data, we may have
duplicated data, which relates to the aspect of accuracy. Our
data was gathered from different sources and then combined,
a process which is error prone as a result of a lack of unique
identifiers for firms and directors. In case of corporate data,
companies can be reported several times or split into several
parts for administrative or financial reasons, as discussed in
Section 1. To counter this, we propose two fixing steps:
1. An a posteriori network construction step in which
we merge nodes (companies) with exactly the same board
of directors and the same GUO (or having no GUO).
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Figure 4: (A) Fraction of companies present by rev-
enue category. (B–D) Distribution of company rev-
enue in our database (orange) and distribution es-
timated using µ and C (blue), for (B) Sweden, (C)
Germany and (D) New Zealand.
2. An a posteriori topology-based correction step in which
we merge all nodes (companies) sharing a similar board and
similar position in the network. To compute the similarity of
boards of two companies, we used the ratio of shared direc-
tors to total unique directors (Jaccard similarity [20]). We
then clustered all companies to obtain sets of firms where
each pair of companies shared at least half of the boards of
directors (using complete linkage clustering and a threshold
for the Jaccard similarity of 0.5 to guarantee this condition).
Then, we further clustered the groups based on their local
position in terms of a) degree, b) average neighbor degree,
c) local clustering coefficient and d) average neighbor local
clustering. All nodes with a similar board and with these
four properties within 80% of each other are then merged
together. While other threshold values are possible, our re-
sults are robust to variations in this parameter: changing
the parameter to 90% or 70% changed the final number of
nodes only by 2.2% and 2.4%, respectively.
4. RESULTS
After analyzing the completeness of our data (Section 3.1),
we have chosen to use the network of Sweden to demonstrate
the effect of the two accuracy fixes proposed in Section 3.2.
As shown in Figure 4, Sweden (SE) has high quality across
all company sizes, which will prevent confounding interac-
tions between completeness and accuracy. We investigate
the effect on network topology in Section 4.1, centrality in
Section 4.2 and finally diffusion in Section 4.3.
Original (A) Step 1 (B) Step 2 (C)
A
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Degree
10- 6
10- 5
10- 4
10-3
10-2
10-1
F
re
qu
en
cy
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Betweenness
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
B C
D E F
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Local clustering
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Pagerank
100
101
G
Figure 5: (A–C) Swedish network visualizations using the ForceAtlas2 algorithm [19] with stronger gravity
to highlight clusters with high local clustering. Color indicates PageRank centrality. (A) Original network,
(B) Network after Step 1, (C) Network after Step 2. (D–G) Comparison of distributions of network measures
for the three networks: (D) Degree, (E) Local clustering, (F) Betweenness and (G) PageRank.
4.1 Topology
The original Swedish board interlock network has 94,496
nodes and 1,050,907 edges in the largest component (Sec-
tion 2), which is reduced to 50,733 nodes and 139,173 edges
after the two steps (Section 3.2). Table 2 shows the num-
ber of nodes (firms), edges (board interlocks), density, av-
erage degree deg, graph clustering coefficient CC and aver-
age node-to-node distance d (see [10] for definitions of these
common network metrics).
As expected given that we are merging clusters with high
local clustering, the average degree and local clustering are
reduced. Indeed, an average degree around 5 or 6 is far more
realistic in board interlock networks than 22. The power
of our approach is further reflected in the network visual-
izations. Figure 5A–C shows the original Swedish network,
and the network after Steps 1 and 2 described in Section 3.2.
While most of the edges in the original network were intra-
corporate administrative ties, the successive steps were able
to filter out such clusters and provide a representative final
network topology.
Nodes Edges Density deg CC d
Original 94496 1050907 0.0119% 22.2 0.93 7.78
Step 1 60904 225887 0.0061% 7.4 0.57 7.94
Step 2 50733 139173 0.0054% 5.5 0.41 8.02
Table 2: Topological properties of the Swedish board
interlock network.
4.2 Centrality
A typical step in social network analysis is to find the most
prominent actors in the network, which is done using cen-
trality measures. In this example, we choose three common
measures: degree centrality, in which the importance of each
node is proportional to its number of connections; PageR-
ank centrality, in which the importance depends on the sum
of the PageRank of your neighbors damped by a factor; and
betweenness centrality, that relates the importance of a node
to the relative number of shortest paths going through the
node. For an overview of work on the use of centrality mea-
sures in board interlock networks, see [13].
Figure 5D–G shows how local clustering and three centrality
measures – degree, betweenness and PageRank – are affected
by our data quality fixes. In general, our filtering mechanism
smooths the distribution of centrality measures. While the
degree distribution of the original data exhibits a fat tail
(Figure 5D), with some companies linked to up to 500 other
companies, this was not the case for the data after Step 1
and 2. This is largely due to the reduction of clusters with
high local clustering (Figure 5E) Importantly, the distribu-
tions of betweenness and PageRank (Figure 5F–G) are only
minimally disturbed, showing a reduction of the number of
nodes with very high betweenness, likely due to a reduction
of clusters of high degree nodes.
Next, we tested if our data quality fixes improved our ability
to obtain correct and thus actionable insights from a central-
ity analysis. For this, we analyzed the correlation between
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Figure 6: (A–F) Correlation between ranking given by number of employees (A–C) or market capitalization
(D–F), and degree, betweenness and PageRank centrality. (G) Fraction of individuals in the Susceptible,
Infected and Recovered states.
the ranking of Swedish companies by number of employees
and market capitalization with the ranking of companies
given by degree, by PageRank and by betweenness central-
ity (Figure 6). We found that each correction step increased
the correlation between the ranking based on economic mea-
sures and the ranking based on network measures. This was
especially the case for degree centrality (Figure 6AD), but
only to a very small extent for betweenness centrality (Fig-
ure 6BE). Moreover, we found that the rankings obtained by
all three network measures are comparable, which indicates
that central nodes have more connections (degree), link to
other important firms (PageRank), and act as bridges be-
tween distant firms (betweenness). Finally, we found that
the ranking given by market capitalization closely matches
the ranking given by centrality (Spearman’s rank correlation
of 0.6 for the top 200-500 companies), showing that larger
companies have also more central roles in the network.
4.3 Diffusion model
As board interlock networks are assumed to play a big role
in the diffusion of information, we tested how accuracy can
affect the results of a SIR (susceptible, infected, recovered)
model. These models are commonly applied to model in-
formation diffusion, as for example in the case of informa-
tion among investors or technology diffusion between com-
panies [21, 22]. To illustrate the effects of data quality, we
have chosen to apply a simple SIR model: starting with one
randomly infected node, at each iteration of the algorithm,
each infected node infects their neighbors with probability
0.5, and recovers (becoming immune) with probability 0.3.
Figure 6G shows the results of running 1000 simulations.
As we can observe, the process dies off in 19%, 27% and 37%
of the simulation runs for respectively the original data and
the data after Steps 1 and 2. Second, the final equilibrium
differs. Removing the clusters with high degree nodes slows
down the spreading cascade and the percentage of nodes in-
fected during the process, from 74% of infected nodes using
the original network to 67% using the post Step 1 network
and 63% using the post Step 2 network. These results are
likely due to the larger number of high degree nodes in the
original network, which allows for more possibilities of infec-
tion, and to the ‘reservoir’ effect of clusters – the infection
quickly spreads within the clusters, infecting neighbors for
a longer time until all nodes in the cluster recover.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The experiments in this paper demonstrate how insights and
predictions obtained from social network analysis can be bi-
ased if the original data is of poor quality. If we want to
ensure that network analysis results are correct, we must de-
termine the quality of the underlying data and where needed
correct for it. In this paper we used corporate board inter-
lock networks to investigate the effect of data quality.
The underlying company data is collected in a distributed
fashion in different countries. Since the missing information
is not distributed at random, assessing the completeness of
this data is challenging. To address this problem, we used
aggregated data from the OECD and fitted lognormal dis-
tributions to the revenue of the companies of each country.
This enables us to calculate the number of missing com-
panies for different revenue ranges, allowing for a thorough
assessment of how much data we are missing in each country.
The second problem addressed in this paper dealt with the
accuracy of the data. This originates from the fact that
data comes from multiple merged data sources, and from
the inherent way in which companies organize themselves.
In order to not overestimate the importance of for example
small companies, we proposed a method to merge corporate
structures and remove spurious nodes. For this, we suggest
two a posteriori solutions to “correct” the network topology,
where we merge together companies with similar boards of
directors and similar structural positions in the network.
In our experiments, we investigated the effect of data quality
by visualizing the networks to show how the original biased
network becomes a “clean” network. First, we demonstrated
how our correction approach fixed the overall network topol-
ogy. Second, we show that the correlation between the most
central nodes in the network and the nodes with higher mar-
ket capitalization increases for the networks that were pro-
cessed by our approach. Third, we show how a simple SIR
model demonstrates that bad data quality network data pro-
duces significant distortions in the results.
6. GENERALIZABILITY & FUTURE
WORK
Although we have shown the applicability of our method in
board interlock networks, the principles could be used across
different networks. The completeness assessment can be ap-
plied to each network in which we know the distribution of
one of the variables in the dataset, and aggregated data on
segments of the data is available. This makes our approach
applicable to the analysis of (co-)citation networks, for ex-
ample to investigate if the considered data sample is biased
toward highly impact publications. We could use the av-
erage number of citations to fit lognormal distributions for
different journals [23], and use those distributions to assess
the completeness of the sample. Similarly, inter-event times
in social communication (for instance emailing, tweeting or
messaging) can also be well fitted by lognormal distribu-
tions [24], whose parameters may depend on the character-
istics of the person. If we have a sample of the messages,
we can assess its bias using the distribution of inter-event
times.
Furthermore, the accuracy fixes that we introduced here
can be applied when networks are compiled from multiple
sources and have not been merged correctly. For instance,
consider combining data on people from two different sources
(e.g., Linkedin, AngelList and CVs) based on their name.
Since the affiliations in Linkedin, AngelList and the CV are
correlated, it is likely possible to use our method to identify
unique people.
While our paper focuses on completeness and accuracy of
nodes, future work can use similar principles to assess the
completeness and accuracy of edges in the network. Fi-
nally, extensions to dynamic networks in which timestamp
attributes are present, could be investigated.
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